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Abstract
Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining,
and claim that their analysis is applicable irrespective of whether the surplus
exists at the start of the game or it is created after all players agree. We
show that their claim is wrong. Their analysis is not applicable when the
surplus is created after all players agree. Hence, some of the important real
life bargaining situations, like management-multiple unions bargaining and
land assembly are not in the scope of Krishna and Serrano (1996).
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Krishna and Serrano (1996) show unique and efficient outcome in a model of
multilateral bargaining with non-unanimous exit. The result is interesting, espe-
cially considering “any distribution of pie is possible” kind of result in the model
with unanimous exit, studied by Shaked.1 Shaked’s analysis is applicable irre-
spective of whether the surplus (under the bargaining) exists at the start of the
game or it is created after all players agree. Krishna and Serrano (1996) claim
that their model, and hence the analysis, is applicable to both the cases too. We,
however, show that their claim is wrong. Their analysis is not applicable when the
surplus is created after all players agree. This implies that some of the important
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1Sutton (1986) credits the work to Shaked.
1
and frequent economic affairs like management-multiple unions bargaining, land
assembly etc, do not fall under the scope of Krishna and Serrano (1996), although
claimed otherwise.
Krishna and Serrano (1996) analyse following model. There are n(≥ 3) play-
ers bargaining to split a unit surplus.2 Imagine an exogenously given sequence of
the players. In the first period, the first player in the sequence proposes a distri-
bution of the surplus, and others respond to the proposal. All those who accept,
get paid as per the proposal and exit the game forever. While all those responders
who reject the proposal and the proposer, bargain over the leftover surplus in the
next period in the same manner. The leftover surplus is the surplus remaining
after funding all the previous exits. Also, the proposer in the new period is the
next player in the sequence who is still in the game. The game continues till n− 1
players exit, leaving the proposer of the last period with the leftover surplus. All
players are risk neutral and discount at a common rate δ ∈ (0, 1) per period.
Since it is a complete information game, Krishna and Serrano (1996) employs
subgame perfect nash equilibrium as the solution concept. Following is one of the
key results from the paper.
Proposition 0. 1 For δ ∈ (0, 1), the game has an unique and efficient subgame
perfect equilibrium.3
Note that an equilibrium is efficient if the game ends in period 1, otherwise it is
inefficient.
In the above model, the exits are funded by the surplus. Hence, the surplus
must exist at the start of the game. In order to accomodate the case in which the
surplus is created only after all players agree, Krishna and Serrano (1996) provide
an alternate interpretation of the model, which is captured in following paragraphs
extracted from Krishna and Serrano (1996, p 63).4
“Consider the bargaining problem of dividing a dollar among three players.
Suppose player 1 proposes a division x = (x1, x2, x3). If both players 2 and 3
accept the proposal the game ends with that division. If both reject, in the second
period player 2 proposes a division y and players 3 and 1 must respond. If player
3 accepts x and 2 rejects, 3 can “exit” the game with an amount x3 while players
2Krishna and Serrano (1996) do not normalize the surplus. Either way, it does not affect any
result.
3The proposition corresponds to Theorem 1 in Krishna and Serrano (1996).
4The alternate interpretation is discussed further in section 8 of Krishna and Serrano (1996).
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1 and 2 are left to bargain over the division of 1−x3 in period 2. This bargaining
now proceeds as in the two player alternating offer game with player 2 proposing
a division of 1− x3.
The game outline above can also be interpreted as one where player 1 offers
to purchase the right(s) to represent the accepting player(s) in any future negotia-
tions. Thus in the example given above, player 1 purchases the right to represent
player 3 in future negotiations at a price of x3. This amount is paid to player 3
immediately by player 1, who then bargains with player 2 over whole pie. We will
refer to this game, interpreted in either way, as the “exit” game.”
While the first paragraph describes the model, the second one presents an al-
ternate model, which differs in only the following way - All the exits in a period
are paid by the corresponding proposer and not the surplus, which is created at the
end of the game. Hence, the leftover surplus in any subgame is the entire surplus.
Krishna and Serrano (1996) assumes that both the models are equivalent. If both
the models are equivalent, then they must yield same result. We analyse the alter-
nate model below and show that this is not the case.
It is straight forward to see that in the alternate model, a subgame with two
players is a Rubinstein (1982) game with unit surplus. Hence, the proposer and




respectively in the first period of the subgame. Fol-
lowing proposition establishes that the alternate model suffers from inefficiency.
Proposition 1 Consider the alternate model. For n ≥ 4 and δ > 1
n−2 , there does
not exist an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let there exists an equilibrium in which all the responders accept the pro-
posal and the game ends in period 1. If one of the responder deviates and rejects
the proposal, he gets 1
1+δ
in the ensuing Rubinstein (1982) game in the next pe-
riod. Hence, the proposer must offer at least δ
1+δ
to each responder for all of them
to accept the proposal.5 Therefore, the maximum possible payoff to the proposer
is pmax = 1− (n− 1) δ1+δ . For n ≥ 4 and δ > 1n−2 , pmax is negative, which is not
possible in an equilibrium. Hence, the result.
Observe the contrast between proposition 1 and proposition 0.1. It is clear that
the two models are not equivalent. To see the intuition behind proposition 1, con-
5This result is shared by some of the other multilateral bargaining models which allow for
simultaneous offers and responses. See lemma 2 in Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012).
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sider δ close to 1. If all other responders are accepting the proposal, a responder
can obtain almost half of the surplus by rejecting the proposal, in the subsequent
Rubinstein type bilateral bargaining. Proposer, therefore, must offer almost half
of the surplus to each responder to make them all accept, which results in loss for
the proposer if there are three or more responders. Hence, the agreements must
take place sequentially. This result is driven by the fact that the surplus is created
at the end of the game and hence, the entire surplus is available for bargaining
in every subgame. This does not happen in the model analysed in Krishna and
Serrano (1996) because the surplus reduces with every exit and hence less surplus
is available for bargaining to those who delay the agreements. Hence, it is less
costly for the proposers to prevent responders from delaying the agreements.
Based on the difference in proposition 1 and proposition 0.1, we conclude that
Krishna and Serrano (1996)’s analysis is strictly restricted to multilateral bargain-
ing situations in which the surplus already exists and is not applicable to the case
in which the surplus is created after all players agree.
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